
Published in The Post, 4 September 2025
The Justice Select Committee has passed a modified version of the proposal for a four-year term of parliament, and the concept of a referendum has the support of all major parties.
This despite the fact that many submissions and comments called into question the move to a four-year term without measures to enhance democracy. For example, the Council of Civil Liberties opposed the bill without improvements in accountability, reduction in executive power, and limitations on the use of urgency, among other important changes. Similarly, legal experts argued that a longer parliamentary term wouldn’t curb government power without other safeguards being implemented.
So, what is the case for a four-year term?
New Zealand is one of just eight jurisdictions out of 186 countries with active legislatures that provides for a term of just three years or fewer. Another one of those eight is the Australian federal Lower House (by contrast all Australian territory and state Lower Houses have at various times shifted to four-year terms). New Zealand and Australia are the only countries with a Westminster system of government to have three-year terms.
The fact that New Zealand is in limited company when it comes to the length of its parliamentary term does not in itself clinch the argument, but it does at least raise the question as to why so many other countries have longer terms
One of the arguments in favour of a longer-term is that it could provide for more considered policymaking and therefore for better governance. Yet the argument in favour of more considered policy-making and better governance resulting from an extension of the Parliamentary term is a hard one to clinch. After all, how does one balance this against the power of the electorate to vote a government out of power, which it can do more precipitously with a three-year term?
The evidence in New Zealand is that the strongest predictor of the length of a government is not its supposed competence or integrity but rather its political complexion. In the 80 years since 1945 none of the five centre-right governments has served fewer than three terms, while of the centre-left governments, only the Savage/Fraser and Clark administrations served more than one or two. The electorate has every right to terminate a government but can do that by limiting the number (rather than the length) of parliamentary terms which an administration has. So, the issue historically in New Zealand may be not so much the length of the term, but the number of terms a government is allowed to serve by the electorate.
There are also financial considerations.
For example, if the dominant pattern becomes, say, two four-year terms rather than three three-year terms under the current model, this puts less pressure on the Electoral Commission, particularly if the same rules apply to local body elections.

This is perhaps a minor consideration, but there is also evidence that business reduces investment in election years and governments put off economic and social reforms of long-term consequence when electoral considerations are proximate, underpinning the New Zealand pattern of “short termism” in policy decision-making.
Any proposal of this nature must pass a referendum. The signs are not good. The issue has been put to the public twice before (in 1967 and 1990) and been roundly rejected on both occasions.
Perhaps the public is concerned that extending the parliamentary term on its own may not encourage “good governance”. There are many aspects of policymaking in the areas of transparency, lobbying, influence of donors, and so on that might give the public cause for concern. In 2024 The Helen Clark Foundation published a report on these matters, with a wide range of recommendations, many of which are accepted practice in jurisdictions around the world (along with four-year terms).
In their submission to the Select Committee on the four-year term proposal Sir Geoffrey Palmer and Emeritus Professor Jonathan Boston enumerated the current difficulties with New Zealand’s current constitutional, legislative, and political arrangements, and suggested changes to meet those concerns.

Among several issues, New Zealand is almost alone in not having either an upper house or a written constitution. Also, the small size of the Parliament means that it is difficult for the legislative arm of government to hold the executive to account properly, and the executive seems to be able to use urgency to override normal scrutiny almost with impunity.
The public could well be much better disposed to a four-year term if such a move was part of a wider reform of governance, including reform of Parliamentary procedures to give the legislature greater power and effectiveness, enhancing deliberative democracy, reforming the Official Information Act, implementing Transparency International’s recommendations on preventing foreign bribery, reducing the influence of “access money” via lobbyists and campaign finance, and enhancing the integrity branches of the state, including ensuring the continuation of a merit-based public service.
The move to a four-year term could be of value to the future good governance of New Zealand, but only if taken as part of a wider process of reform to enhance democracy, transparency, and accountability.
Peter Davis, Emeritus Professor in Population Health and Social Science, University of Auckland.
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